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Abstract 
Integrated Conservation and Development Projects (ICDPs) have frequently been established 
in Africa to improve wildlife conservation and the welfare of local communities. However, 
their effectiveness so far has been hampered by conflicts and illegal harvesting activities. 
Within a Gordon–Schäfer-type model, this paper focuses on the strategic interaction between 
the manager of a protected area and a group of local people living near the park. The park 
manager benefits from wildlife through non-consumptive tourism and safari hunting. The 
local people benefit through hunting, although this is illegal according to existing laws, but 
they also bear costs as wildlife causes agricultural damage. Depending on the economic and 
ecological environment, we show that ICDPs relying on money transfers to the local people 
derived from the park manager’s activities may or may not promote wildlife conservation. In 
addition, we demonstrate that the effects on the welfare of the local people are ambiguous. 
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1 Introduction 
Protected areas have long been recognized as the single most important method of conserving 
wildlife and preserving biological diversity. For most African countries, this practice dates 
back to the colonial era, and the objective has always been to protect wild animals and natural 
habitats through strongly restricted wildlife utilization. However, the establishment of 
protected areas has often displaced rural communities from their traditional lands. This policy 
has also alienated the wildlife from the local people, and has frequently transformed wildlife 
from a valuable commodity into a threat and a nuisance (Kiss, 1990; Swanson and Barbier, 
1992; Martin, 1993; Barrett and Arcese, 1995; Gibson and Marks, 1995; Songorwa, 1999). 
For these and other reasons, many protected areas have operated directly against the economic 
interests of the local communities (see, e.g., Brandon and Wells, 1992; Milner-Gulland and 
Leader-Williams, 1992; Wells, 1992; Wells and Brandon, 1992; Nepal and Weber, 1995), and 
persistent poaching pressure has led to a growing recognition that this ‘fences and fines’ 
approach has failed to achieve its objective of preserving wildlife (Marks, 1984; Leader-
Williams and Albon, 1988; Kiss, 1990; Swanson and Barbier, 1992). 
Hence, the main approach to recent wildlife management schemes has been to include the 
local people to gain their cooperation and support, which has eventually resulted in the so-
called Integrated Conservation and Development Projects (ICDPs) (see, e.g., Wells and 
Brandon, 1992). These projects involve varying levels of local participation, ranging from 
pure benefit sharing, such as transfers from wildlife-related activities, to a more far-reaching 
design of community-based management in which local communities are trained to manage 
and control resources. While the core objective of these projects is protected area 
conservation (Brandon and Wells, 1992), the aim is to achieve this by promoting economic 
development and by providing local people with alternative income sources that do not 
threaten wildlife. 
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This paper focuses on ICDPs based on pure benefit-sharing strategies. Several existing 
ICDPs engage in game meat distribution as well as revenue sharing, under which a part of the 
park’s income is distributed to local people in the form of cash transfers (see, e.g., Brandon 
and Wells, 1992; Barrett and Arcese, 1995). These elements directly improve local income 
and welfare, and are implemented separately or in combination in several existing ICDPs. 
Well-known examples are the CAMPFIRE in Zimbabwe, the ADMADE program in Zambia 
and the Serengeti regional conservation project in Tanzania (see, e.g., Brandon and Wells, 
1992; Barrett and Arcese, 1995 and 1998; Gibson and Marks, 1995).1 
However, the functioning of ICDPs may be limited by possible design dilemmas and trade-
offs inherent in linking conservation and development. Wells and Brandon (1992), Ferraro 
(2001), and Ferraro and Kiss (2002), among others, question the underlying assumption that 
local people will respond to benefit transfers by voluntary refraining from activities that 
would otherwise undermine natural resource conservation. That is, local people may 
incorporate new sources of income as complements to existing activities rather than as 
substitutes for them. These authors therefore stress the need to change incentives from 
indirect measures (say, through the agricultural sector) to direct measures; that is, transfers 
conditional on conservation results. 
Possible shortcomings of the benefit-sharing components of ICDPs are also discussed by 
Barrett and Arcese (1995). They argue that transfers of game meat from managed harvests 
                                                 
1 In addition, several ICDPs generate benefits to the local people through local job creation in the formal sector 
and stimulation of increased productivity in the agricultural sector. For instance, the Lupande development 
project in Zambia promotes agricultural improvements and offers local villagers employment opportunities as 
game scouts, park guards etc. (Wells and Brandon, 1992). Employment in park activities has also been generated 
by the ADMADE and CAMPFIRE programs (Barrett and Arcese, 1995). For a broader review of existing ICDP 
strategies, see e.g., Brandon and Wells (1992), Wells and Brandon (1992) and Barrett and Arcese (1995). 
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may increase local people’s dependence on game meat and thereby promote illegal hunting. 
They also identify the functioning, or lack of functioning, of rural markets as a factor limiting 
the effectiveness of money transfers from tourism. They argue that, for cash transfers to work, 
local people must be able to exchange money for food or other consumption goods. However, 
in rural and remote areas, the opportunity to do this is often constrained by poor access to 
markets due to high transaction costs, for example (Muller and Albers 2004).2  
Some unintended effects of ICDPs on illegal hunting and wildlife conservation have also 
been analysed within explicitly formulated economic models. One such contribution is from 
Barrett and Arcese (1998), who analyse the ICDP components of money transfers from 
tourism and transfers of game meat to the local people by using a household model. They 
assume that the household hunts illegally for its own consumption. In this framework, the 
household responds to game meat transfers by substituting illegal meat for legal meat and, 
consequently, this policy succeeds in discouraging illegal hunting. However, Barrett and 
Arcese find that the sum of the illegal and legal offtake increases, and hence game meat 
distribution reduces the degree of wildlife conservation. Skonhoft (1998) analyses a similar 
scheme for game meat distribution but reaches the opposite conclusion regarding wildlife 
conservation. The conclusions differ because Barrett and Arcese consider the local people as 
the active agent, whereas the park agency controls the wildlife stock in Skonhoft’s model. 
Skonhoft assumes that the park manager earns income from safari hunting and by providing 
non-consumptive tourism services such as observing wildlife. By forcing the park manager to 
transfer a fixed share of the wildlife harvest to the local people, the return from safari hunting 
is reduced relative to the return from wildlife under tourism. Consequently, the park manager 
responds by making further investments in wildlife conservation. 
                                                 
2 The pioneering theoretical exposition of missing markets is by De Janvry et al. (1991). 
 6
Barrett and Arcese (1998) show that money transfers from non-consumptive tourism may 
increase illegal hunting by generating a positive income effect on game meat consumption. 
Although the mechanism is different, this result is consistent with that of Skonhoft’s (1998) 
model of the park manager. If the park manager is instructed to transfer a fixed share of the 
tourism income to the local people, the return from tourism is reduced relative to the return 
from safari hunting. The park manager responds to this by reducing investment in wildlife 
conservation. Hence, both contributors suggest that ICDPs relying on money transfers fail to 
conserve wildlife. (See also Muller and Albers (2004), who show how the ICDP’s optimal 
transfers depend on the market for labour and resources.) 
In this paper, we formulate a stylized bio-economic model to analyse the impact of the 
ICDP’s benefit-sharing components. Unlike in previous models, both agents—the park 
manager and a group of local people living near the protected area—are assumed to harvest 
wildlife and to respond to economic incentives. Strategic interdependence between the park 
manager and the local people is therefore incorporated. The basic structure of the model is 
presented in section 2. Transfers within the ICDP framework are analysed in section 3. We 
examine two types of money transfer from the park manager to the local people: transfers 
from safari hunting and transfers from non-consumptive park activities. In section 4, we 
compare the ICDP solution with the solution of the social planner. Both the pre-ICDP and 
ICDP situations are analysed under biological and economic equilibrium. Biological 
equilibrium implies that harvesting equalizes natural growth all the time. The economic 
equilibrium is that of the Nash one-shot game. Throughout the text, we use general functional 
forms as well as refer to solutions based on the so-called Gordon–Schäfer assumptions. 
Details are in the Appendix. 
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2 The basic model and the pre-ICDP solution 
We consider the conflicting interests between the agency managing the protected area and the 
local people living in the vicinity of this area. The park agency benefits from the wildlife 
through safari hunting and non-consumptive tourism services such as wildlife viewing. The 
local people also hunt wildlife, but as the wildlife knows no boundaries and moves freely in 
and out of the protected area, the game also destroy agricultural crops and compete with 
livestock when outside the protected area. Hence, in this model, as in reality, the wildlife also 
represents a nuisance for the local people. Hunting by the local people is illegal. However, 
because the funds are small and the areas are large, poaching cannot be prevented by the park 
manager (see, e.g., Kiss, 1990). Hence, de jure and de facto property rights differ. 
The local people are treated as a homogeneous group, which implies that there are no 
conflicting interests among them. Hence, in our framework, individuals conform to group 
norms, and in line with tradition, the elders are assumed to be in charge of group activities 
(Marks, 1984). It is assumed that the net benefit of the wildlife is maximized. The hunting 
strategy of the local people is therefore not of the open-access type (but see section 5 below). 
The park agency is assumed to maximize the profit from the two park activities. However, in 
section 5, we also discuss briefly how culling, rather than safari hunting, used to reduce 
grazing intensity and maintain the ecological system, influences conservation and the welfare 
of the local people. 
The two production activities practised by the conservation agency, non-consumptive 
tourism and hunting, and illegal hunting by the local people are constrained by wildlife 
abundance. Throughout, we let one stock of wildlife X, measured in numbers of animals or 
biomass, represent the whole game population. The population dynamics are determined by 
natural growth and hunting, and in biological equilibrium, the total offtake equals natural 
growth. If 1e  and 2e  are the levels of hunting effort of the park manager and the local people, 
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respectively, the equilibrium relationship between the wildlife stock and the effort levels may 
be expressed as: 
),( 21 eeXX = . (1) 
Increased hunting effort reduces the stock, / 0iX e∂ ∂ < , i =1,2. Throughout, a positive 
stock level is assumed, 0>X . 
Under the Gordon–Schäfer assumptions, the harvesting functions are linear with regard to 
effort and stock level; i.e., i i iy q e X= , where iq  is the productivity (catchability) coefficient. 
In addition, the natural growth function is specified as the logistic, ( ) (1 / )F X rX X K= − , 
where r  is the intrinsic growth rate and K  is the carrying capacity. Given these functional 
forms, equation (1) is a downward-sloping linear relationship in 1 2( , )e e  space, and its slope is 
determined by the relative hunting productivity. For a given stock level, this line is also 
termed the iso-conservation schedule. Hence, a line closer to the origin represents effort 
combinations for which there is more wildlife (see Appendix for details). 
The park manager obtains income from hunting wildlife, by selling hunting licences, and 
from non-consumptive tourism. The net benefit of hunting depends on hunting effort and the 
stock level, and is typically given by )X,e(HH 111 = , with 01 >∂∂ X/H  because more 
wildlife means a higher offtake for a given effort level, and 1 1/ 0H e∂ ∂ >  if the hunting profit 
is positive (see below). ( )W X  represents the profit from non-consumptive tourism, and 
implies that more wildlife makes the park more attractive, but at a decreasing rate; i.e., 
0>)X('W  and 0<)X(''W . In addition, (0) 0W = . Hence, the income from non-
consumptive tourism is similar to the so-called ‘wealth effect’ in models of optimal growth 
(Kurz 1968). The profit of the park manager is therefore: 
)X(W)X,e(H += 11π . (2) 
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The local people derive utility from hunting wildlife illegally. The poaching benefit is a 
function of hunting effort and the stock level; i.e., )X,e(HH 222 = , with 02 >∂∂ X/H . 
However, 22 e/H ∂∂  may be positive or negative (see below). Wildlife is also a nuisance, and 
the damage cost ( )D X  is assumed to depend on the size of the stock. More wildlife means 
more damage, 0>)X('D , while there is no damage if there is no wildlife; (0) 0D =  (Zivin 
et al., 2000).3 Accordingly, the net benefit to the local people is given by: 
)X(D)X,e(HU −= 22 . (3) 
In the absence of a unified resource policy, there are several externalities. The traditional 
reciprocal harvesting externalities work through the hunting benefit functions. In addition, 
there are reciprocal stock externalities related to the stock values: more hunting effort by the 
park manager, ceteris paribus, induces a positive externality on the local people through a 
reduction in ( )D X . On the other hand, more hunting effort by the local people induces a 
negative external effect on the park manager through a reduction in ( )W X . 
The economic problem of the park agency is to determine the profit-maximizing hunting 
effort under the ecological constraint (1), given the effort of the local people. The direct effect 
of increased effort is a higher harvesting benefit. However, more hunting effort reduces the 
wildlife stock, which in turn lowers the non-consumptive benefit and increases the hunting 
cost. The park manager will therefore expend effort on hunting to equalize the marginal 
benefit and marginal cost of hunting, which depend on the two stock effects. Hence, the 
necessary condition for a maximum, given a positive effort level, is: 
                                                 
3 As wildlife is a nuisance, hunting by the local people also represents damage control. In reality, damage 
control is also performed through fencing and other measures more directly related to protecting the crop. Such 
measures are, however, neglected, in the present model. 
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1 1 1 1 1 1 1( , ) / [ ( , ) / ]( / ) '( )( / ) 0H e X e H e X X X e W X X e∂ ∂ + ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ + ∂ ∂ = . (4) 
Because 1/X e∂ ∂  is negative, while 1 /H X∂ ∂  and )X('W  are positive, 1 1/H e∂ ∂  is 
positive. Under the functional forms of the Gordon–Schäfer model, this term yields the 
harvesting profit per unit effort (see below and the Appendix). 
The first-order condition (4) is also be the park manager’s best-response function, denoted 
by )e(R 21  in Figure 1. It is downward sloping because increased hunting effort by the local 
people increases the pressure on wildlife and thereby reduces the optimal hunting effort of the 
park manager. Along the best-response curve, profit depends on the effort of the local people, 
)e( 2ππ = , and the envelope theorem implies 02122 <∂∂+∂∂= e/X)'WX/H(de/)e(dπ . 
In Figure 1, 0π  and 1π  yield two iso-profit curves, where 1π  > 0π . 
The economic problem of the local people is to determine the utility-maximizing 
harvesting effort 2e , subject to the ecological constraint (1) and the effort of the park 
manager. The direct effect of more effort is an increased hunting benefit. The indirect effect, 
working through a smaller wildlife stock, is twofold. First, increased effort lowers utility 
through higher hunting costs. Second, unlike in the problem of the park manager, greater 
effort increases utility by lowering wildlife numbers, which results in reduced crop damage. 
The local people take these trade-offs into account when deciding the optimal harvesting 
effort. For a positive effort level, the necessary condition for maximum harvest is: 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2( , ) / [ ( , ) / ]( / ) '( )( / ) 0H e X e H e X X X e D X X e∂ ∂ + ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ − ∂ ∂ = . (5) 
Because 2/ 0X e∂ ∂ < , while )X('D  and 2 /H X∂ ∂ are positive, 2 2/H e∂ ∂  may be either 
positive or negative. Hence, in contrast to the park manager, the unit harvesting profit of the 
local people may be positive or negative. If there is extensive damage, profit will be negative, 
which implies that the optimal strategy is to harvest enough for a negative harvesting profit 
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per unit of effort to be balanced by a small number of nuisance animals. Whether this happens 
also depends on the harvesting activity of the park manager. 
Figure 1 about here 
Equation (5) represents the local people’s best-response function, denoted by 2 1( )R e  in 
Figure 1. Along the best-response curve, utility depends on the effort of the park manager, 
)e(UU 1= , and the envelope theorem implies )e/X)('DX/H(de/)e(dU 1211 ∂∂−∂∂= . 
Accordingly, greater effort by the park manager reduces the optimal utility of the local people 
if the marginal harvesting benefit dominates the marginal damage effect; i.e., if 
2( / ') 0H X D∂ ∂ − > . Hence, under this condition, the iso-utility curves, 0U  and 1U , in Figure 
1 are such that 0 1U U> . Otherwise, in the ‘nuisance’ case, when 02 <−∂∂ )'DX/H( , 
greater effort by the park manager is beneficial because reduced damage dominates the 
reduced harvesting benefit. This is illustrated by the two iso-utility curves 3 2U U> . These 
iso-utility curves bend in the opposite direction to that of U0 and U1 (see the Appendix). 
In what follows, we assume an interior solution, in which the Nash equilibrium is given by 
the effort levels *1 0e >  and *2 0e >  in Figure 1.4 the best-response function of the park agency 
is steeper than that of the local people, in accordance with the Gordon–Schäfer model (see the 
Appendix). In addition, the iso-conservation schedule through the Nash equilibrium 
* * *
1 2( , )X X e e=  is steeper than the best-response curve of the local people, but is flatter than 
that of the park manager. This also accords with the Gordon–Schäfer model. The location of 
                                                 
4 Depending on prices, values and costs, in addition to ecological factors, boundary solutions with either 0*1 =e  
or 0*2 =e   can arise. This may happen if a high marginal tourist value is accompanied by a high hunting cost-
 12
the equilibrium stock level can imply so-called biological overexploitation; i.e., * msyX X< . 
This may arise if, for instance, the cost–price ratios of hunting are low and the nuisance value 
is high relative to the marginal valuation of poaching. 
The detailed comparative static results can be determined in the linear specification of the 
model by using the Gordon–Schäfer assumptions. The harvesting profit of the park manager 
is then 1 1 1 1 1 1 1( , ) ( )H e X p q e X c e= − , where 1p  is the price of the safari hunting licence, 
assumed to be fixed, while 1c  is the unit price of organizing the hunting, also assumed to be 
fixed. The harvesting benefit of the local people is 2 2 2 2 2 2 2( , ) ( )H e X p q e X c e= − , where the 
values of 2p , 2q  and 2c  generally differ from those of the park manager (see also section 4). 
In addition, the stock values are assumed to be linear; i.e., ( )W X wX=  and ( )D X Xγ= , 
with 0w >  and 0γ >  being the fixed marginal tourist benefit and fixed marginal damage 
cost, respectively. 
Consider first the effect of an increase in the price of safari hunting licences 1p . The 
relative profitability of consumptive and non-consumptive activities of the park manager is 
affected, and the price increase results in greater hunting effort, given the effort levels of the 
local people. This causes an outward shift in )e(R 21 , and hence, 
*
1 1/ 0e p∂ ∂ >  and 
*
2 1/ 0e p∂ ∂ < . The mechanism behind these effects is that increased hunting effort by the park 
manager causes the wildlife stock to shrink, and in turn, the local people find it economically 
rewarding to expend less harvesting effort. However, it can be demonstrated that the increased 
effort of the park manager dominates the indirect effect relating to the local people. We 
therefore find * 1/ 0X p∂ ∂ < , so the new economic equilibrium intersects with an iso-
                                                                                                                                                        
price ratio of the park manager. We then have 0*1 =e  together with 0*2 >e . The opposite case may arise if a 
high cost-price ratio of hunting is accompanied by a low nuisance value (also see the Appendix). 
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conservation schedule further from the origin. The profit of the park manager increases, 
*
1/ 0pπ∂ ∂ > , while the utility effect for the local people depends on the sign of 
)'DX/H( −∂∂ 2 . If the marginal harvesting benefit dominates, then * 1/ 0U p∂ ∂ < . In the 
opposite ‘nuisance’ case, when 2( / ') 0H X D∂ ∂ − < , we find 01 >∂∂ p/U * , in which case, 
increased profit for the park manager is associated with improved welfare for the local people 
(see the Appendix). 
Table 1 about here 
Increased profitability in non-consumptive tourism has the opposite effect of an increase in 
1p . Hence, 1 2( )R e shifts downwards, and 
*
1 / 0e w∂ ∂ <  and *2 / 0e w∂ ∂ > . Therefore, the 
indirect effect of reduced harvesting by the park agency results in more poaching effort being 
expended by the local people, partly to reduce crop damage, and partly to reap a greater 
harvesting benefit. Again, the direct effort effect dominates the indirect effect, which results 
in * / 0X w∂ ∂ > . The profit of the park manager increases, while the effect on the utility of the 
local people is ambiguous. However, if the marginal benefit of harvesting exceeds the 
marginal damage, the increased profitability of the non-consumptive activity of the park 
manager improves economic conditions for the local people (see the Appendix for details). 
Increased wildlife-induced damage motivates the local people to expend more harvesting 
effort and 2 1( )R e  shifts upwards. Therefore, 
*
1 / 0e γ∂ ∂ <  and *2 / 0e γ∂ ∂ > . The mechanism is 
that increased hunting effort by the local people reduces the wildlife stock, to which the park 
manager responds by devoting less effort to harvesting. We also find 0<∂∂ γ/X * . 
Consequently, the profit of the park manager falls as the income from both tourism activities 
shrinks. In addition, more nuisance reduces the welfare of the local people. 
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The rest of the comparative static results are reported in Table 1. Note the ambiguous 
effects on hunting effort of an increase in 2p . An increase in 2p  increases the net harvesting 
benefit and motivates the local people to expend greater hunting effort. On the other hand, the 
increase in 2p  also reduces the value of wildlife damage relative to the value of wildlife meat, 
which has the opposite effect. Hence, the standard result, 2 2/ 0e p∂ ∂ > , only arises if the 
nuisance is low relative to the harvesting cost. If the nuisance is relatively high, the price 
increase leads to reduced harvesting effort by the local people and to more wildlife. 
3 The ICDP solution 
So far, we have analysed the economic and ecological equilibrium when there are no transfers 
from the park manager to the local people. We now consider the ICDP situation to determine 
how such transfers may affect wildlife conservation and the welfare of the local people. The 
ICDP transfers are modelled by assuming that the local people, perhaps through the legal 
system, are granted some of the park benefits, and hence, some property rights over the 
wildlife. In what follows, the (exogenous) fractions 10 ≤≤α  and 10 ≤≤ β  of the incomes 
from safari hunting and non-consumptive tourism, respectively, represent these transfers. 
Accordingly, the profit of the park manager changes to: 
)X(W)()X,e(H)( βαπ −+−= 11 11 . (6) 
The benefit of the local people becomes: 
)X(W)X,e(H)X(D)X,e(HU βα ++−= 1122 . (7) 
The stock-effort condition (1) implies that increased hunting effort by the local people, 
ceteris paribus, reduces wildlife abundance. Because the transfers from safari hunting and 
non-consumptive tourism are related to the stock of wildlife, equations (6) and (7) indicate 
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that there is an indirect effect of the level of transfers received on the hunting activity of the 
local people. Hence, in the presence of ICDPs, there are additional costs of increased hunting 
effort, which work through reduced transfers from the protected area. In the ICDP scenario, 
local people take this into account when choosing their effort levels. For the park manager, it 
is the shifts in the relative valuation of the park benefits that matter. Hence, assuming an 
interior solution, the first-order conditions for the park manager and the local people, 
respectively, are: 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1(1 ){ ( , ) / [ ( , ) / ]( / )} (1 ) '( )( / ) 0H e X e H e X X X e W X X eα β− ∂ ∂ + ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ + − ∂ ∂ = , (8) 
[ ] )e/X(X/)X,e(He/)X,e(H 222222 ∂∂∂∂+∂∂  
[ ] 0212 =∂∂+∂∂+∂∂− )e/X()X('WX/H)e/X)(X('D βα . (9) 
Following Skonhoft (1998), we consider three different ICDP schemes: (i) uniform 
transfers from the two activities, in which case, 10 <=< βα ; (ii) only transfers from non-
consumptive tourism, in which case, 0=α  and 10 << β ; and (iii) only transfers of 
harvesting benefits, in which case, 0=β  and 10 <<α . We analyse these schemes in turn. 
Given condition (8), case (i), uniform transfers, does not change the relative valuations of 
harvesting and non-consumptive wildlife utilization of the park manager. Consequently, the 
best-response function )e(R 21  is unchanged (see Figure 2). However, 2 1( )R e  shifts inwards 
because transfers increase the marginal cost of hunting and reduce hunting effort (see above). 
The new Nash equilibrium is therefore characterized by more harvesting effort by the park 
manager and reduced harvesting effort by the local people. Moreover, the new equilibrium is 
below the original iso-conservation schedule and is consistent with more conservation. The 
effect on the welfare of the local people is ambiguous. The direct effect is clearly positive, 
 16
while the indirect effect, which works through the increased harvesting effort of the park 
manager, may be positive or negative. The sign depends on whether the marginal nuisance 
dominates the marginal harvesting benefit. If the marginal nuisance dominates, the increased 
harvesting of the park manager reduces the nuisance by more than it reduces the harvesting 
benefit and, consequently, the indirect effect reinforces the direct positive effect on the 
welfare of the local people. Otherwise, the welfare effect is ambiguous. 
Surprisingly, the effect on the profit level of the park manager is, in general, also 
ambiguous. This is because the transfers expand profit opportunities because, ceteris paribus, 
an increase in the stock of wildlife increases the income from safari hunting as well as from 
non-consumptive tourism. If these effects are strong, uniform transfers may increase the profit 
of the park manager. Therefore, there is a potential for more wildlife and higher welfare for 
both parties under an ICDP scheme based on uniform transfers. Increased welfare represents 
an efficiency gain of the transfers. 
Figure 2 about here 
In case (ii), with 10 ≤< β  and 0α = , the value of the non-consumptive use of wildlife 
reduces relative to the value of hunting by the park manager. Consequently, as illustrated in 
Figure 3, the best-response curve )e(R 21  shifts outwards. Compared to the pre-ICDP 
scenario, transfers from non-consumptive tourism increase the marginal cost of hunting for 
the local people, who consequently find it economically rewarding to reduce their hunting 
effort. The new best-response curve )e(R 12  therefore shifts inwards. Hence, the new Nash 
equilibrium is characterized by reduced hunting effort by the local people and greater effort 
from the park manager; i.e., *1 / 0e β∂ ∂ >  and *2 / 0e β∂ ∂ < . 
Figure 3 about here 
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However, as the best-response curves shift in opposite directions, the conservation effect is 
ambiguous and depends on the relative effort shifts. The important factor is the local people’s 
valuation of game meat relative to the price of safari hunting. It seems reasonable to assume 
that the price of hunting licences exceeds the local valuation of game meat (see below). In this 
case, it can be shown that income transfers from tourism lead to greater wildlife conservation, 
as illustrated in Figure 3. This result contrasts with the finding of Skonhoft (1998), who 
focuses solely on how transfers affect the decision problem of the park manager (see above). 
Like uniform transfers, this type of transfer may also increase the welfare of the local 
people. The conservation effect is positive and substantial if the effect on the hunting effort of 
the park manager is small; that is, if the price of safari hunting licences is high relative to the 
local valuation of game meat. Such advantageous conditions for safari hunting reinforce the 
welfare effect for the local people (i.e., the indirect welfare effect is insignificant) and the 
park manager (i.e., the indirect effect on profit is large). Thus, an ICDP policy relying on 
income transfers from non-consumptive tourism is more effective if the return on safari 
hunting is high. 
Now consider case (iii), in which 10 ≤<α  and 0β = . This scheme increases the relative 
value of the non-consumptive activity and, consequently, it is economically beneficial for the 
park manager to reduce hunting effort, and so )e(R 21  shifts inwards (Figure 4). This time, 
)e(R 12  also shifts inwards. The new equilibrium is therefore characterized by lower total 
effort and hence, * / 0X α∂ ∂ > . Although the mechanisms are different, this result is 
consistent with the prediction of Skonhoft’s (1998) single-agent model. Figure 4 illustrates a 
situation in which the local people reduce their effort, while the effort of the park manager 
increases. 
Figure 4 about here 
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This type of ICDP transfer therefore succeeds in promoting wildlife conservation, while 
the welfare effects are ambiguous. If the price of safari hunting licences is high relative to the 
local valuation of game meat, the hunting effort and offtake of the park manager increases. In 
addition, greater wildlife conservation raises the income from non-consumptive tourism. 
These effects may offset the direct effect of transfers and hence increase the profit of the park 
manager. In turn, greater harvesting effort from the park manager, which weakens the positive 
conservation effect, may strengthen the positive welfare effect for the local people if the 
marginal nuisance dominates the marginal harvesting benefit. 
4 Social planner’s solution 
It has been demonstrated that the benefit transfers of the ICDP may succeed in promoting 
wildlife conservation and improving the welfare of the local people. We now study how these 
redistribution schemes fit to the social planner’s solution of a unified resource management 
policy. Assuming that the profits from park activities and the net benefit of the local people 
are given equal weight,5 the problem of the social planner is to maximize: 
1 1 2 2( ) ( , ) ( ) ( , ) ( )U H e X W X H e X D Xπ + = + + − , (10) 
subject to the ecological constraint (1). 
The following two equations yield the first-order conditions for maximum: 
1 2 2 1 1/ [ ( , ) / ]( / ) '( )( / ) 0e H e X X X e D X X eπ∂ ∂ + ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ − ∂ ∂ ≤ , 01 ≥e , (11) 
2 1 1 2 2/ [ ( , ) / ]( / ) '( )( / ) 0U e H e X X X e W X X e∂ ∂ + ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ + ∂ ∂ ≤ , 02 ≥e . (12) 
                                                 
5 It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss this assumption critically. 
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The complementary slackness conditions are indicated explicitly because either 1 0
se =  or 
2 0
se = , or both 1 2 0s se e= = , are strong candidates for a solution (the superscript ‘s’ denotes 
the social planner’s solution) . The reason for this is that there may be large gaps in harvesting 
productivity and harvesting profitability between the two agents. These gaps would make it 
socially beneficial to steer hunting activity towards the most productive and profitable agent. 
Alternatively, in the case of a high marginal benefit from non-consumptive tourism and a 
small marginal damage cost and low harvesting values, it may be profitable for both agents to 
refrain from hunting. The Appendix demonstrates that a corner solution unambiguously arises 
under the Gordon–Schäfer assumptions. 
In what follows, we assume that hunting is profitable, and that harvesting by the park 
manager is more productive and profitable than is harvesting by the local people. This seems 
reasonable as the price of safari hunting licences exceeds the price of game meat on the local 
market (see, e.g., Cater, 1987; Holmern et al., 2002). In addition, the hunting productivity of 
the park manager is presumably high relative to the productivity of the local people because 
the former use more sophisticated weapons and hunting methods (see, e.g., Arcese et al., 
1995). This case is illustrated in Figure 5, in which the vertical line se1  illustrates the positive 
harvesting effort of the park manager following the implementation of the social planner’s 
solution. 
Figure 5 about here 
The vertical line at se1  is to the right of the park manager’s best-response function in the 
Nash pre-ICDP solution. This is because the social planner takes into account the fact that 
harvesting by the park manager imposes a positive externality on the local people in the form 
of reduced crop damage. However, whether the wildlife stock at the social optimum is below 
or above the market level is ambiguous (see the Appendix). A high marginal income from 
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non-consumptive tourism and a small marginal nuisance tend to increase the stock of wildlife 
in the social optimum. On the other hand, because the social planner restricts wildlife 
harvesting to the relatively productive and profitable agent, the overall profitability of 
harvesting is higher than in the market equilibrium and this tends to reduce the stock of 
wildlife. Figure 5 illustrates the case in which the first effect dominates so that *sX X> . 
The benefit-sharing components of ICDPs may shift the pre-ICDP solution towards the 
social planner’s solution with respect to both the allocation of hunting effort and the extent of 
wildlife conservation. As demonstrated in section 3, this happens for transfers from non-
consumptive tourism and for transfers from safari hunting if the price of safari hunting 
licences is high relative to the local valuation of game meat. However, note that this result is 
based on the assumption that the marginal damage is low, so that the wildlife stock in the 
social optimum is above the market level. The opposite result emerges if the marginal damage 
is high, so that *XX s < . In general, it is indeterminate whether transfers to the local people 
shift the pre-ICDP solution towards the social planner’s solution. 
5 Summary of the findings and concluding remarks 
Integrated Conservation and Development Projects (ICDPs) attempt to promote wildlife 
conservation and economic development among local communities. However, studies of 
existing ICDPs have revealed various difficulties. In this paper, we have added a new element 
to the analytical literature analysing ICDP’s benefit-sharing components; namely, the strategic 
interdependence between the conservation agency and the local people is represented when 
both agents harvest wildlife. For the park manager, wildlife has consumptive and non-
consumptive value, while to local people, wildlife represents both a benefit and cost. 
We have focused on ICDP instruments related to income transfers from non-consumptive 
tourism and safari hunting. The analysis predicts that uniform transfers, under which local 
people are given property rights over the wildlife in the form of a fixed share of the park 
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profit, reduce poaching and increase wildlife conservation. We find that transfers from safari 
hunting also promote wildlife conservation. In addition, income transfers from non-
consumptive tourism may increase the stock of wildlife if local people’s valuation of game 
meat is low relative to the price of hunting licences. The welfare of the local people increases 
only if the effect of the money transfers dominate the effect of poaching and wildlife-induced 
damage. This happens in the nuisance case and under relatively advantageous economic 
conditions for safari hunting. We have also analysed how redistribution schemes compare 
with the social planner’s solution. We found that ICDP instruments can shift the pre-ICDP 
equilibrium away from the social optimum if the marginal damage is high relative to the 
marginal harvesting value for the local people. This demonstrates that greater conservation 
may contradict the social planner’s solution, in which all benefits and costs of the wildlife are 
taken into account. 
Models only approximate reality and are only as good as the assumptions on which they 
are based. It is beyond the scope of this paper to address how ICDP transfers are distributed 
among the local people, and the extent to which various distribution schemes are consistent 
with the current adherence of individual conformity to group norms. Whether utility 
maximization is an adequate representation of the behaviour of smallholder farmers living 
under complex and often harsh conditions may also be questioned. Alternatively, assuming 
that the poaching strategy is of the pure open-access type affects our conclusions because, in 
that case, the stock of wildlife, under certain conditions, is determined by the zero-rent 
harvesting condition of the local people. This arises under the Gordon–Schäfer assumptions, 
under which 2 2 2 2 2( , ) ( ) 0H e X p q X c= − = , and hence, ICDP transfers have no effect on the 
stock of wildlife. Since the nuisance effect on the local people is also unaffected by the 
transfers, and because there is no harvesting benefit, the welfare effect of the various transfer 
schemes is equivalent to the amount of the direct transfers. 
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Throughout, we have also assumed that the park manager maximizes profit from both park 
activities. However, in many protected areas and parks, there is no commercial hunting, and 
hunting activity is simply culling to maintain the ecological system (see, e.g., Starfield and 
Bleloch 1986). The goal of the park manager is then typically to maintain a large and 
‘sustainable’ stock of wildlife. Under such a management scheme, the best-response function 
of the park manager coincides with the iso-conservation schedule representing the target stock 
size. Hence, the various types of ICDP transfer would simply change the best-response 
function of the local people, which implies reduced harvesting benefits and the same level of 
nuisance. We have also ignored the possibility of cooperation between the local people and 
the wildlife management authority, although ICDPs, in principle, are based on, and are 
intended to promote, cooperation. The two agents are also assumed to have full information 
about each other’s harvesting technology and costs, which is questionable. However, these 
simplifications have enabled us to identify the important driving forces behind harvesting and 
wildlife utilization that are apparent in more complex, and hence realistic, settings. 
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Figure 1: The pre-ICDP equilibrium. 
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Figure 2: ICDP policy: uniform transfers, 0 1α β< = < . *0ie and *1ie  denote pre-ICDP and 
ICDP effort levels, respectively. 
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Figure 3: ICDP policy: transfers from non-consumptive tourism, 0 1β< <  and 0α = . *0ie and 
*1
ie  denote pre-ICDP and ICDP effort levels, respectively. 
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Figure 4: ICDP policy: transfers from safari hunting, 0 1α< <  and β = 0. *0ie and *1ie  denote 
pre-ICDP and ICDP effort levels, respectively. 
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Figure 5: The social planner’s solution. 
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Appendix 
The basic model 
With Schäfer harvesting functions and linear stock values (see the main text), the profit 
and utility functions, respectively, are as follows. 
1 1 1 1( )p q X c e wXπ = − +  (A1) 
Xe)cXqp(U γ−−= 2222  (A2) 
When natural growth is specified by the logistic (see the main text), we find 
1 1 2 2(1 / ) 0rX X K q e X q e X− − − =  in ecological equilibrium. Hence 0X =  and the stock-effort 
relationship is: 
1 1 2 2(1 / / ) 0X K q e r q e r= − − >  (A3) 
For a fixed stock level, this is also the iso-conservation line under the Gordon–Schäfer 
assumptions (cf. the main text). 
Maximizing (A1) with respect to 1e , subject to (A3) together with a fixed 2e , yields the 
best-response function of the park agency: 
[ ] [ ]1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2( ) ( / 2 ) 1 / / ) / 2e R e r q w p r c p q K q q e= = − − − . (A4) 
Maximizing (A2) with respect to 2e , subject to (A3), and a fixed 1e , yields the best-
response function of the local people: 
[ ] [ ]2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 1( ) ( / 2 ) 1 / / / 2e R e r q p r c p q K q q eγ= = + − − . (A5) 
Solving for effort levels and the stock level yields: 
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*
1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 2( / 3 )[2(1 / ) (1 / ) 2 / / ]e r q c p q K c p q K w p r p rγ= − − − − − , (A6) 
*
2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 1( / 3 )[2(1 / ) (1 / ) 2 / / ]e r q c p q K c p q K p r w p rγ= − − − + + , (A7) 
[ ]* 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 2( / 3) 1 ( / / ) / /X K w p r p r c p q K c p q Kγ= + − + + . (A8) 
Along the best-response function, the utility of the local people changes according to 
1 1 1 2 2 2( ) / ( / )( )dU e de q K r p q e γ= − +  in the Gordon–Schäfer case. Minimum utility along 
2 1( )R e  is therefore obtained when 2 2 2/e p qγ= , which coincides with the condition 
2 / ' 0H X D∂ ∂ − =  in the general case (cf. the main text). The iso-utility curves have the 
regular shape above this effort level, while they bend in the opposite direction in the nuisance 
case. This can be seen from the total differential of (A2), for a fixed utility level, which, after 
some rearrangement, is 2 1 1 2 2 2 2/ ( / )( ) /( / )de de q K r p q e U eγ= − ∂ ∂ . The comparative static 
effects on effort and stock are given by equations (A6)–(A8). Note the ambiguous effects of 
2p  (see the main text). 
Differentiating (A1) and (A2) in equilibrium and using the envelope theorem yields the 
profitability and utility comparative static results. The effects of a shift in, say, w  are: 
* ** *
1 1 1 2 2/ ( )( / )( / )w X p q e w X e e wπ∂ ∂ = + + ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ , (A9) 
**
2 2 2 1 1/ ( )( / )( / )U w p q e X e e wγ∂ ∂ = − ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ . (A10) 
Because 2( / )X e∂ ∂  is negative while *2( / )e w∂ ∂  is positive, the sign of (A9) is ambiguous. 
However, after substituting for *X and *1e , it can be shown that the expected result, 
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* / 0wπ∂ ∂ > , holds. However, the sign of * /U w∂ ∂  is indeterminate, but is negative in the 
nuisance case. 
The ICDP solution 
The profit and utility functions under the Gordon–Schäfer functional specifications are: 
1 1 1 1(1 )( ) (1 )p q X c e wXπ α β= − − + − , (A11) 
2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1( ) ( )U p q X c e X p q X c e wXγ α β= − − + − + . (A12) 
The best-response functions are: 
[ ] [ ]1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2( ) ( / 2 ) 1 (1 ) /(1 ) / / 2e R e r q w p r c p q K q q eβ α= = − − − − − , (A13) 
[ ] [ ]2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 1( ) ( / 2 ) 1 / / / (1 / ) / 2e R e r q p r c p q K w p r q p p q eγ β α= = + − − − + . (A14) 
Differentiation yields: 
[ ]
[ ]
2 1 1 1 1
1 1 2 2 2 2 2
2
1 1
1 1 1 2 2
1 /(2 ) / 2(1 )
(1 / ) /(2 ) 1 /(2 )
(1 ) / 2(1 )
/(2 )
q q de w p q
d
q p p q de w p q
w p q
d
p q e p q
α βα
β α α
⎡ ⎤−⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ = ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥+ −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤− − −⎣ ⎦+ ⎢ ⎥−⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
. (A15) 
The determinant of this system is [ ]1 2(1/ 4) 3 /p pα− , which is assumed to be positive. 
This implies that 1 2( )R e  is more negatively sloped than )e(R 12 . For 1 2p p>  (see the main 
text), there must be an upper limit on α . 
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We demonstrate the profitability and utility effects in the uniform transfers case, in which 
0 1α β< = ≤ . Setting α β σ= =  and differentiating (A11) and (A12) with respect to σ , and 
using the envelope theorem, yields: 
* * ** * *
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2/ ( ) ( )( / ) ( / )p q e X c e wX p q e w K r q eπ σ σ∂ ∂ = − − + − + ∂ ∂ , (A16) 
* * * ** * *
1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 1/ ( ) ( )( / ) ( / )U p q e X c e wX p q e K r q eσ γ σ∂ ∂ = − + − − ∂ ∂ . (A17) 
Inserting α β σ= =  into equation (A15) and solving for *2 /e σ∂ ∂  gives: 
[ ]*2 1 1 2 2 2 1 2/ 2( ) / (3 / ) 0e p q e w p q p pσ σ∂ ∂ = − + − < . (A18) 
Hence, from (A17), it is clear that the sign of * /U σ∂ ∂  is ambiguous and depends on the 
sign of 2 2 2( )p q e γ−  (see also the main text). Combining (A16) and (A18) reveals that the sign 
of * /π σ∂ ∂  is also ambiguous. 
The social planner’s solution 
Substituting the Gordon–Schäfer functional forms into equations (11) and (12) of the main 
text yields the first-order conditions: 
{ }21 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 1( ) / ( / ) 2 ( ) / ( ) 0U e K r p q e p p q q e p q r c r K w qπ γ∂ + ∂ = − − + + − − − ≤ , (A19) 
{ }22 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 2 2( ) / ( / ) 2 ( ) / ( ) 0U e K r p q e p p q q e p q r c r K w qπ γ∂ + ∂ = − − + + − − − ≤ .(A20) 
The second-order conditions are 2 2( ) / 0iU eπ∂ + ∂ <  ( 1, 2)i =  and 
[ ][ ] [ ] 0/)(/)(/)( 2212222212 >∂∂+∂−∂+∂∂+∂ eeUeUeU πππ . The first of these conditions holds 
unambiguously, while the second one is violated since it implies 21 2( ) 0p p− < , which is 
 32
impossible, after rearrangement. We then have three possible corner solutions (see also the 
main text). We consider the first possibility (i). With 1 0
se >  and 2 0se = , equation (A19) 
holds as an equality, while equation (A20) holds as an inequality. Solving (A20) with respect 
to se1  yields: 
1 1 1 1 1 1( / 2 )[1 / ( ) / ]
se r q c p q K w p rγ= − − − . (A21) 
Substituting for 1
se  in (A20) (as an inequality) yields 
[ ] [ ]22222211111 2 p/)w(Kqp/rcrp/)pp(p/)w(Kqp/rcr γγ −−−>+−−− , which holds 
if the price, cost and productivity conditions are favourable for the park manager. The 
resulting stock level is: 
[ ]1 1 1 1( / 2) 1 /( ) ( ) /sX K c p q K w p rγ= + + − . (A22) 
Substituting (A21), (A22) and 02 =se  into (10) yields the following overall net benefit, 
after some rearrangement: 
[ ]21 1 1 1 1 1 1( / 4) 1 / ( ) / ( / )( )s sU p rK c p q K w p r c p r wπ γ γ+ = − + − + − . (A23) 
In case (iii), with no profitable harvesting, in which case, 1 0
se =  and 2 0se = , the overall 
net benefit is K)w(U ss γπ −=+ . This may be below or above the level implied by positive 
harvesting by one of the agents. It can be shown that not exploiting the stock is the best option 
if harvesting values are low when the net stock value, ( ) 0w γ− > , is substantial, which is 
intuitive. Otherwise, harvesting is profitable from the social planner’s point of view, and in 
the main text, it was assumed that the park manager harvested. The difference between the 
stock level in this case, given by (A22), and the level under the pre-ICDP market solution, 
given by equation (A8), is as follows: 
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[ ]{ }* 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 1( / 6) 1 / 2 / (3 2 / ) /( )sX X K c r p q K c p q K w p p p rγ⎡ ⎤− = + − + − −⎣ ⎦ . (A24) 
From this expression, it is clear that if w is high, γ is small, and 1p  and 2c  are not too high, 
the stock level in the social planner’s solution exceeds that implied by the pre-ICDP solution. 
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Tables 
Table 1: Comparative-static results in the pre-ICDP solution 
 *e1  
*e2  
*X  *π  *U  
1p  + – – + ? 
w – + + + ? 
γ  – + – – – 
2p  – +/– –/+ –/+ ? 
1c  – + + – ? 
2c  + – + + ? 
r ? ? ? ? ? 
K ? ? ? ? ? 
Note: A +/– implies that a reduction in *2e (–) is accompanied by a higher 
*X  (+), and vice versa. A ? implies 
that the sign is ambiguous. 
